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ABSTRACT 
 
This study identifies the players involved in the international accounting standard 
setting process for the extractive industries.  Publicly available data is used to expose 
connections between key constituents involved in the process, to enhance understanding 
of how the international accounting standard setting process occurred, and to identify 
future research possibilities. 
Key words: extractive industries; international accounting standards; standard setting.  
INTRODUCTION 
With the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), a 
profound change has occurred in the way many entities, including the world’s largest public 
companies, produce their general purpose financial reports.  This is particularly significant in 
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the case of extractive industries accounting, with the International Accounting Standards 
Board yet to develop a comprehensive international accounting standard, and instead still 
struggling to achieve consensus among the many and varied interests of constituents.  With 
accounting and accounting standard setting now accepted as being highly politicised 
activities, this paper provides insight into the constituents that contribute to the process of 
developing an international accounting standard for the extractive industries.   
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Defined as the petroleum (oil and gas) and mining industries (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000a), the extractive industries have substantial economic, social, political, 
and environmental impacts.  Many of the world’s largest extractive companies, such as the Royal 
Dutch/Shell group, BP, BHP Billiton, and ExxonMobil, are well known and established household 
names.  The economic strength of the major extractive industries companies is such that many are 
richer and more powerful than the states and even countries that seek to regulate them (Global Policy 
Forum, 2006).  Indeed, six of the world’s top twelve companies are from the extractive industries, 
being BP, Chevron/Texaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, the Royal Dutch/Shell group, and TOTAL 
(Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000, Fortune Magazine, 2005).  In 2005, these six companies recorded 
combined revenues in excess of US$1.2 trillion and profits of US$92 billion (Fortune Magazine, 
2005).  Comparing the combined revenues of these six global companies with current United States 
Gross Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank, 2005) gives some perspective of the 
enormous economic strength of the major international extractive industries companies.  The political 
influence of this sector flows on from its economic strength.  Extractive industry coalitions have been 
active lobbyists in regulatory debates concerning issues such as global climate change, taxation 
policy, and sustainable development, with many, such as the American Petroleum Institute, formed 
specifically for the purpose of influencing public policy and regulatory processes for the benefit of 
members (American Petroleum Institute, 2006).  The environmental impacts are arguably the most 
visible consequence of extractive activities, and the social impacts are also significant, with major 
extractive operations often responsible for improving infrastructure in and around the area being 
mined, increasing capital investment to a community and/or country, providing employment 
opportunities, and boosting local economies.   
The substantial economic, political, social, and environmental impacts of the 
extractive industries contribute to the accountability of this sector and make evident the 
importance of the accounting practices used by extractive industries companies to report on 
their financial performance and position.  One aspect of extractive industries accounting that 
has been plagued by controversy concerning the methods of accounting for pre-production 
activities.  In an attempt to report on this phase of extractive operations in the most favourable 
light, the full cost and successful efforts methods of accounting have developed.1  These two 
methods of accounting have been the cause of considerable controversy within the extractive 
industries due to the significantly different results generated under each method.  First raised 
in the United States of America (US) in the 1960s (Van Riper, 1994), the debate over 
successful efforts versus full cost accounting has remained unresolved.  Companies in the US, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom are still able to choose between these two methods of 
accounting when reporting on exploration and evaluation activities.   
In 1998, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) undertook 
to remedy the disparate accounting practices by proposing the development of an 
international accounting standard that enhanced comparability and consistency of financial 
reporting by extractive industries companies across the world (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000a).  This was to be achieved, in part, by narrowing accounting 
alternatives and prescribing a single method of accounting for exploration and evaluation 
consistent with the successful efforts concept (International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2000a).     
The full cost versus successful efforts issue was considered in the IASC’s 
Extractive Industries Issues Paper (hereafter referred to as the Issues Paper), published in 
November 2000 (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  The Issues Paper 
was the first stage in the process of developing an international accounting standard for the 
                                                 
1 The area-of-interest method and appropriation methods are other derivatives of these two main methods, and 
are practiced in Australia and South Africa respectively. 
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extractive industries and, as part of the process, was opened for public comment until June 
2001.  Comment letters were received from 52 respondents, with many of these from 
multinational extractive industries companies and extractive industries lobby groups.  While 
the majority of respondents supported the proposal to narrow accounting alternatives and 
require all companies to report under the successful efforts method, two industry lobby 
groups vehemently opposed the proposal and argued that both the successful efforts and full 
cost methods should continue to be permitted.     
After a series of delays, incorporating the IASC’s restructure and reformation as 
the IASB, an international accounting standard for the extractive industries was finally issued 
in December 2004 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004b).  However, despite the 
claimed intentions of narrowing accounting alternatives and bringing about consistency in 
extractive industries reporting, in the resultant accounting standard, the IASB failed to 
achieve these objectives.  Instead, International Financial Reporting Standard 6, Exploration 
for and Evaluation of Minerals Resources (IFRS 6), granted extractive industries companies 
an exemption from the restrictive provisions contained in other international accounting 
standards.  This had the effect of enabling extractive industries companies to continue to use 
the accounting policies in place immediately before the adoption of IFRS 6 to account for 
exploration and evaluation expenditure.  In sum, IFRS 6 merely codified existing industry 
practice, perpetuating the disparate methods of accounting for exploration and evaluation, and 
maintaining the status quo for extractive industries companies.   
The striking failure of the IASB to follow through with its aim of remedying the 
inconsistencies of extractive industries accounting, particularly with respect to the successful 
efforts versus full cost issue led to a consideration of the possible factors that may have 
influenced this decision.  Of interest, therefore, is the story behind the process of setting the 
international accounting standard for the extractive industries.  This story cannot be conveyed 
by a perfunctory analysis of the positions for and against the IASC/IASB’s proposals and 
how these might be linked to the outcome of the process.  Rather, it is necessary to consider 
who took these positions, in addition to identifying others perhaps less visibly involved, in 
order to gain insight into how the accounting standard was developed.  To tell this story, the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries was examined 
with a view to illuminating the political nature of accounting, and exposing the underlying 
institutions and arrangements of accounting.   
RESEARCH APPROACH: CRITICALLY EXAMINING THE PROCESS 
International accounting standards are set within an institutional context that 
incorporates the IASC/IASB funding arrangements and the IASC/IASB due process 
procedures.  Within this institutional structure, IASC/IASB constituents may participate in 
the standard setting processes.  Examining these constituents and their role is crucial to a 
critical investigation of international accounting standard setting process because it enables 
the researcher to go behind the scenes of the process to make visible the powerful coalitions 
and players that contribute to and influence the process.  Importantly, without this deep, 
multi-layered analysis, these coalitions and players may otherwise remain masked by the 
seemingly transparent and objective international accounting standard setting arrangements.   
The IASC/IASB funding arrangements 
The IASC launched its external funding program in 1990, with revenue received 
from three main sources: fees paid by Board members and by the International Federation of 
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Accountants, profits made on IASC publications, and voluntary contributions made by 
companies and other organisations with an interest in the work of the IASC (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 1999).  Under these arrangements, the major international 
accounting firms were the IASC’s largest source of funding (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 1993).   
This funding model was considered to be a considerable threat to the legitimacy 
of the international accounting standards because the IASC relied on voluntary endorsement 
of, and compliance with, its standards from the same constituents that were funding its 
activities.  In an attempt to overcome this problem, the Committee was restructured in 2000 
and the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF) was formed as a 
not-for-profit entity.  A board of trustees was appointed to the Foundation and charged with 
the responsibility of raising funds to support the international accounting standard setting 
activities (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).  The IASC was renamed the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the trustees also became responsible 
for appointing members to the Board and overseeing the IASB’s activities (International 
Accounting Standards Board, 2004a). 
  Under the new funding arrangements, large multinational corporations, stock 
exchanges, national accounting standard setting bodies, central banks, government entities, 
international agencies, and international accounting firms became the benefactors of the 
IASB (Brown, 2004, International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2004).  The 
major international accounting firms continued to be the primary benefactors, with each 
pledging to contribute £1 million per annum to the IASB, approximately one-third of the 
IASB’s estimated operating budget.  In 2004, the IASB received contributions totalling over 
£9 million from 184 corporations, associations, and other institutions, including a number of 
the world’s leading multinational corporations such as BP plc, Shell International, General 
Electric, Pfizer, Vodaphone, and the New York Stock Exchange (International Accounting 
Standards Committee Foundation, 2004).  
Despite these efforts to improve the actual and perceived transparency of the 
external funding program, the arrangements continued to come under attack from 
commentators who suggest that there still exists a dependency relationship between the 
IASC/IASB and its benefactors, which may influence the issues considered (Brown, 2004, 
Mitchell, et al., 1994, Mitchell and Sikka, 1993).  For example, it has been argued that critical 
issues, such as environmental and social accounting and accounting for small and medium 
sized enterprises, are marginalised in favour of those that align with the political and 
economic interests of supporters (Brown, 2004).  Brown (2004) further noted that the IASB’s 
current agenda items, which cover business combinations, present value, financial 
instruments, and extractive industries, are indeed consistent with concerns facing the large, 
multinational conglomerates that support the IASB.  A related transparency issue in the 
international accounting standard setting arrangements involves the due process procedures 
followed by the IASC/IASB when developing a standard.   
The IASC/IASB due process 
The IASC/IASB’s due process procedures were designed to protect the 
openness, neutrality, and independence of the accounting standard setting process and enable 
arguments for and against proposals to be raised at several points during the development of a 
standard (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004a).  The due process for the 
extractive industries accounting standard began in 1998 when the IASC added the project to 
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its formal agenda.  However before considering the due process in more detail, it is important 
to note the significance of the agenda setting process itself.  This process may be considered 
an exercise of power in which certain issues may be “disregarded or suppressed and denied 
agenda entrance” (Walker and Robinson, 1993, p.4).  In this way, the agenda may be 
restricted to relatively safe issues as a result of confining the scope of decision making 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p.43).  Cousins and Sikka (1993, p.53) noted that even once an 
issue is placed on the formal agenda, it may be that subsequent information, such as that 
gathered during the due process, is “controlled by the very people/groups who are being 
called to account”.  In other words, the “facts” surrounding an issue may be shaped by the 
priorities and influence of powerful groups who wish to maintain the status quo (Cousins and 
Sikka, 1993, p.4).   
There is no publicly available information regarding how, by whom, or why the 
extractive industries project was initiated, however the international prominence, economic 
influence, and divergent accounting practices of the extractive industries were listed as factors 
contributing to the importance of the project (International Accounting Standards Committee, 
2000a).  Further, as will be revealed in subsequent sections, many of the IASC/IASB’s 
financial underwriters and supporters are extractive industries enterprises.  Thus, following 
the reasoning of Brown (2004) and Mitchell and Sikka (1993), it may be argued that the 
admission of the project to the IASC’s agenda, at least in part, was a consequence of the 
relationship between the IASC and its extractive industries benefactors. 
The IASC’s extractive industries project aimed to address accounting 
measurement and disclosure issues for the extractive industries, and was led by a Steering 
Committee developed specifically for the project (International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2000b).  The Steering Committee was internationally representative, with 
members from Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of America (US) (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000a, Micallef, 2001).  The professional backgrounds of Committee 
members’ were also varied and included past and/or present partners of each of the Big 4 
accounting firms, past and/or present mining and petroleum company executives, academics, 
and financial analysts. 
The Steering Committee reached its first milestone in November 2000, with the 
publication of the Extractive Industries Issues Paper.   The Issues Paper was a 412 page 
document consisting of 16 chapters, which raised a number of “Basic Issues” concerning 
matters such as reserve estimation and valuation, recognition and measurement of inventories, 
and financial statement disclosures. The Issues Paper was published with an invitation for 
interested parties to comment by 30 June 2001 on the matters raised.  In addition, given the 
“widespread interest” in the project, the Steering Committee also sent the Issues Paper to the 
“senior financial officers of nearly 300 extractive industries companies worldwide” with a 
direct request for comment (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000b, p.19).  
To guide commentators, the Issues Paper set out the Steering Committee’s tentative views on 
some of the issues considered most significant.  For example, in chapter four of the Issues 
Paper, one of the Basic Issues concerned the accounting method to be used by petroleum 
enterprises for their financial statements, with the Steering Committee indicating its 
preference for a method consistent with the successful efforts concept.  Respondents to the 
Issues Paper were required to indicate their preferences on the Basic Issues raised and thereby 
indicate their agreement or disagreement with the Steering Committee’s tentative views.   
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The comment letters 
Despite the Steering Committee’s efforts to elicit responses, and the supposed 
interest in the project, 52 comment letters were received in respect of the Issues Paper.  These 
were from respondents in countries including Australia, Canada, China, Germany, South 
Africa, the UK, and the US.  The principal activities of the respondents were varied and 
included mining and petroleum companies, extractive industries lobby groups, international 
accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, standard setting bodies, and academics.  To 
summarise this information, respondents have been categorised according to location and into 
one of the following groups: mining companies, mining industry lobby groups, petroleum 
companies, petroleum industry lobby groups, accounting firms, professional accounting and 
standard setting organisations, and others (academics and individuals).   
The majority of comment letters were received from Australian commentators 
(21 percent), followed by the UK (19 percent), South Africa (13 percent), the US (13 
percent), Germany (8 percent), and Canada (4 percent).  Petroleum companies and petroleum 
industry lobby groups were the largest respondent group (33 percent), followed by mining 
companies and mining industry lobby groups (29 percent), professional accounting and 
standard setting organisations (25 percent), the Big 4 accounting firms (7 percent), and others 
(6 percent).   
As noted, one of the controversies addressed in the Issues Paper concerned the 
method of accounting for pre-production activities.  Respondents were asked to comment on 
which of the four methods of accounting for pre-production costs should be adopted by an 
international accounting standard for the extractive industries (full cost, successful efforts, 
area-of-interest, appropriation) (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000a).  In 
addition, respondents were to indicate whether they advocated the use of only one of these 
methods or whether more than one method should be permitted.  The Steering Committee’s 
tentative view was that a method consistent with the successful efforts concept should be 
adopted and that only this method of accounting for pre-production costs should be permitted.   
There was overwhelming support for the use of the successful efforts method of 
accounting with 87 percent of respondents commenting on this issue indicating a preference 
for the successful efforts method only.  In contrast, only 13 percent of respondents 
commenting on this issue indicated their support for having the option of both the successful 
efforts and full cost methods.  Thus, the Steering Committee’s tentative view on this issue 
was supported, with the majority of respondents preferring a single method of accounting for 
pre-production costs consistent with the successful efforts concept. 
This content-based type of analysis is characteristic of most studies of 
accounting standard setting.  It is also considered to be preliminary in this research because it 
is limited in three respects: First, who is making a particular argument and what is being said 
is masked by the aggregation of the responses.  Treating submissions as votes does not take 
into account the relative power of the respondents making the submissions, nor does it reflect 
the decision making processes of the IASC/IASB, which is arguably more complex than a 
simple tally of preferences (Walker and Robinson, 1993).  Secondly, the relationships 
between the respondents and other key (but perhaps less visible) players in the process 
remains hidden.  Simply because a company does not respond directly, and therefore 
publicly, to the IASC/IASB on a proposed issue does not mean that they have played no part 
in the accounting standard setting process (Walker and Robinson, 1993).  Thirdly, based on 
the preliminary analysis, there appears to be little conflict among respondents and the IASC.  
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This apparent absence of conflict over the successful efforts and full cost methods is contrary 
to the long-standing and intense debate that has surrounded this issue.  As such, it is pertinent 
closely to examine the responses, and the respondents and other key players in the extractive 
industries and the relationship between them.  This type of critical analysis seeks to reveal 
how shared meanings may be created between the players and how this ultimately influences 
the development of the accounting standard.  
MAKING CONNECTIONS 
Analysis of the raw demographic data obtained from the comment letters 
submitted in response to the Issues Paper showed that the majority of respondents agreed with 
the Steering Committee’s proposal to mandate the use of the successful efforts method only 
when accounting for pre-production activities.  This analysis, although relatively superficial, 
is useful for summarising responses and as a starting point for subsequent investigations of 
power/capture.  To conduct these investigations, closer examination of the respondents was 
undertaken and revealed a number of overlapping interests between the key players.  The 
overlaps have been categorised in terms of funding, representation, and relationships, and are 
summarised in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Summary of overlaps between the IASC/IASB, the Big 4, extractive industries companies, and 
industry lobby groups 
 
Auditor/client relationship with extractive industries companies
Extractive industries lobby groups
IASC/IASB
Big 4
Extractive industries companies
IASC/IASB financial support and representation
Auditor/client relationship with Big 4
Membership of extractive industries lobby groups
Membership of extractive industries lobby groups
IASC/IASB financial support and representation
Provide representation and advocacy for extractive industries companies                 
and other members  
 
 
At the centre of these overlaps is the IASC/IASB.  Overlaps exist between the IASC/IASB 
and other key players due to the funding arrangements of the IASC/IASB and key players’ 
representation on the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.  The Big 4 accounting firms 
are portrayed as the first layer of overlap because of the substantial financial contribution 
made by these firms to the IASC/IASB and the high level of representation of the Big 4 on 
the boards and committees of the IASC/IASB.  Following the Big 4 are extractive industries 
companies, which overlap with the Big 4 in terms of auditor/client relationships and with the 
IASC/IASB in terms of funding and representation.  The third layer comprises the industry 
lobby groups which represent the interests of members (which includes extractive industries 
companies and the Big 4) when liaising with the IASC/IASB.  Figure 2 provides an example 
of one of these overlaps.  
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Figure 2. Example of overlaps between the IASC/IASB, the Big 4, extractive industries companies, and 
industry lobby groups 
  
As noted, the IASC/IASB benefits substantially from the Big 4 and, as shown in 
Figure 2, KPMG contributes one million pounds per annum in financial support.  KPMG is 
also represented on the IASB Boards and Committees, including the Steering Committee that 
was responsible for the preparation of the Issues Paper.  However, as well as providing 
financial, personnel, and technical support, the Big 4 firms serve an important liaison function 
between the IASB and their clients.  For example, at least one of the Big 4 have a focus 
group, comprising representatives of its extractive industries based clients, which meets 
monthly to discuss issues arising from IASB developments, provide training on the 
implementation of IASB pronouncements, and formulate responses to IASB proposals 
(Personal communication, 2004).  Georgiou (2004) provided evidence that a considerable 
number of companies lobby the IASB through their external auditor thus requiring extensive 
consultation between auditor and client in order to ensure that client interests are accurately 
represented.  Ryan et al. (1999, p.177) also noted the tendency of auditors to “adopt the 
position of their clients” when participating in the accounting standard setting process.  That 
these international accounting firms advocated the use of a single method of accounting 
consistent with the successful efforts method is not surprising given that their extractive 
industries client base is likely to comprise the major players in the extractive industries that 
already using the successful efforts method for accounting for exploration and evaluation 
costs.   
Given the relationship between the IASC/IASB and the Big 4, and the Big 4 and 
their clients, an indirect relationship is established between the IASC/IASB and the major 
corporations, creating another layer of influence between the IASC/IASB, the Big 4, and the 
major corporations.  This influence is heightened by the direct relationship between some of 
these companies, for example BHP Billiton as shown in Figure 2, and the IASC/IASB in 
terms of financial support and/or representation.  That is, not only does BHP Billiton have the 
potential to influence the IASC/IASB indirectly through its affiliation with KPMG, it also has 
a direct relationship with the IASC/IASB through the financial support it provides.   
American Petroleum Institute
Membership base includes KPMG and BHP Billiton
KPMG
Auditor for BHP Billiton
Member of the American Petroleum Institute
Financial supporter of the IASB
Client of KPMG
Member of the American Petroleum Institute
Extractive industries lobby groups
Extractive industries companies
BHP Billiton
Big 4
IASC/IASB
1m pounds p.a., represented on IASB and Steering Committee
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As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the third layer comprises the extractive industries 
lobby groups that participated in the international accounting standard setting process.  The 
American Petroleum Institute (API)’s membership list, which was used for the example, 
includes six of the world’s top twelve companies that together earned revenues in excess of 
US$1.2 trillion during 2005.  Another lobby group, the Oil Industry Accounting Committee 
(OIAC)’s membership list was more elusive than the API’s, however the members that could 
be discerned were equally impressive and also included each of the Big 4.  While each of 
these lobby groups’ memberships include the major extractive industries players, they also 
represent hundreds of smaller, independent companies that together represent a formidable 
force against regulatory bodies such as the IASC/IASB.  In their responses to the IASC in 
respect of the Issues Paper, both the API and the OIAC argued strongly for the retention of 
the full cost and successful efforts methods of accounting.   
Interestingly, while some of the members of these coalitions individually 
responded to the Issues Paper and commented that they agreed with the IASC’s proposal to 
eliminate the full cost method, they were also likely to be instrumental to the development of 
the policy positions taken by the lobby groups that represented them.  For example, BHP 
Billiton submitted an independent comment letter in response to the Issues Paper that 
supported the requirement of a single method of accounting for exploration and evaluation 
consistent with the successful efforts method.  However, the API’s comment letter was 
vehemently opposed to the elimination of the full cost method.  Another example is the 
position taken by the OIAC and those taken by the Big 4, which are also members of the 
OIAC.  While PwC and Deloitte indicated their support for the IASC’s proposal to require 
only the successful efforts method, the OIAC strongly opposed this proposal.  However, the 
collaboration of the OIAC’s members in developing the position taken by the Committee 
must have been substantial given that KPMG’s response to the IASC was identical to that 
submitted by the OIAC.    
This analysis of the constituents highlights the complexity and intricacy of the 
overlaps between key players in the international accounting standard setting process for the 
extractive industries.  As noted, the IFRS that was eventually issued, essentially codified 
existing industry practice, thus perpetuating the existing flexibility in extractive industries 
accounting and permitting extractive industries companies to continue to use whichever 
method of accounting deemed most appropriate by management to account for the 
exploration and evaluation activities (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004b).  
Therefore, the new international accounting standard for the extractive industries was in fact 
not new at all, and merely reinforced the existing status quo, being flexibility in financial 
reporting.  This is consistent with Mitchell and Sikka’s (1993, p.29) observation that the 
“institutions and practices of accountancy are collusive and undemocratic” and that 
institutions, such as the IASC/IASB, are “dedicated to defending the status quo and sectional 
interests rather than wider interests”.   
CONCLUSIONS 
The IASC/IASB’s extractive industries project was commenced in 1998, with 
the objective of enhancing comparability and consistency of extractive industries accounting 
and financial reporting.  Issued in December 2004, the outcome of the IASC/IASB’s project, 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Assets, is simply a codification of existing 
industry practice.  In other words, despite all of the time, money, and other resources 
expended to eliminate divergent accounting practices within the extractive industries, nothing 
has changed. 
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The purpose of this research has been to uncover the players involved in the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive.  Future research 
possibilities may seek to explore the players more deeply and interpret findings through a 
theoretical lens such as institutional theory, particularly institutional isomorphism, and/or one 
which specifically theorises the power and politics involved in regulatory processes.  While 
the politicisation of accounting standard setting is widely acknowledged, the revelation that 
economically dominant groups can covertly wield such power is a sobering one in the light of 
the worldwide promotion and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards.   
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